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Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control 
Board: Exposing Inherent Tensions in the California Water 
Code With Respect to Water Transfer Markets 
Aaron E. Baker* 
[Existing] California water rights law includes impediments to 
the fullest beneficial use of California's water resources . . . . 
- Governor Jerry Brown1
Introduction 
In 1987, Delta Wetlands Properties (DW) filed applications for water 
right permits for a unique water storage project.2  The proposed project 
would convert islands in the Sacramento River Delta into reservoirs.3  
Although the project listed the proposed uses for the stored water as 
"irrigation, domestic, municipal, industrial, fish and wildlife enhancement 
and preservation, and water quality uses,"4 it did not intend to use the water 
itself, but to sell it to other users on California's water transfer market for 
these purposes.5  As such, it was a speculative enterprise, dependent upon 
the assumption that "existing demand for water in California is not met in 
most years."6 
After more than a decade of iterations and permit amendments, DW's 
project assumed its final shape, which would create reservoirs on two 
islands with a potential estimated yield of between 114,000 and 175,000 
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of California Hastings College of the Law,
San Francisco, California; Chair, 2008 California Water Law Symposium. 
1. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-26-77 (May 11,1977).
2. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1643 (Feb. 15, 2001).
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 22; see also Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal.
Rptr. 3d  898, 900 (2004). 
6. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1643, supra note 2, at 22.
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acre-feet annually (afa).7  In pursuing permits, DW worked diligently to 
address the concerns of the many protesting parties.8 DW entered into 
several settlement agreements dealing with issues such as water rights 
priorities, effects on salinity and water quality in the northern Delta, fishery 
protection, impacts on Central Valley Project (CVP) and State Water Project 
(SWP), habitat restoration/development, and levee seepage and stability.9  In 
2001, the State Water Resources Control Board ("the Board") granted DW's 
permit to appropriate water.10 
Unfortunately, DW had been unable to settle the protests of the 
Central Delta Water Agency (CDWA). After the Board issued permits for DW's 
project, CDWA brought suit against the Board.11  CDWA's complaint alleged 
that the Board erred in issuing the permits to appropriate water without 
requiring specific purchase contracts for the water.12  CDWA argued that the 
Board failed in its duty to investigate the beneficial use of the water that the 
DW project planned to sell.13 
The court, in an opinion written by Justice Coleman Blease, author of 
the landmark California Trout case in 1989 along with a dozen other important 
water cases,14 agreed with CDWA: "an application for a permit to impound 
water in a reservoir must state, and the Water Board must determine, that 
7. Id. at 27.
8. Id. at 9.  Initially there were many protestors to the project, including:
Central Delta Water Agency, various reclamation districts, M&T Inc., CCRC Farms, 
LLC, Palm Tract Farms (collectively CDWA); North Delta Water Agency; PG&E; 
California Urban Water Agencies; Contra Costa Water District; EBMUD; City of 
Stockton; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation; Department of Water Resources; state water 
contractors; Department of Fish and Game; California Sportfishing Protection 
Alliance; Committee to Save the Mokelumne; Peter M. Margiotta; Amador County; 
Caltrans; California Farm Bureau Federation; Natural Heritage Institute; Diablo Water 
District, Kyser Shimasaki; Kevin Wolf; Bay Institute of San Francisco; California 
Waterfowl Association; San Joaquin River Group Authority; Ducks Unlimited; and 
Westlands Water District.  Id. 
9. Id. at 10-15.
10. Id. at 82.
11. Id. at 16.   Issues included concerns with levee seepage and stability, a
limited right of entry for CDWA to the reservoir and habitat islands, establishing a 
dispute resolution process, providing financial security to CDWA for performance of 
the agreement and payment of damages, and establishing a reclamation plan for the 
islands to return them to farmable condition or shallow marsh habitat.  Id. 
12. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d  898,
900 (2004). 
13. Id.
14. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989).
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an actual, intended beneficial use, in estimated amounts, will be made of 
the impounded waters."15  In so holding, the court rejected the Board's 
reliance on "potential" beneficial use.16 
Justice Blease's opinion reflects a counterproductive tension in the 
water code regarding water transfer markets.  The Water Code, case law, and 
Board precedent all indicate that Blease's opinion rests comfortably within 
water law precedent.  However, the opinion stands in stark contrast with the 
Legislature's explicit policy of creating incentives to develop a water transfer 
market that can help alleviate an increasingly imbalanced ratio between 
supply and demand of California's water.17  In an era where many experts 
anticipate future, systemic supply crises, perhaps the "comfortable" legal 
rationale is not the best one.  Though projects such as the DW proposal are 
not sufficient to answer California's future water needs, they can provide 
flexible alternatives to the development of large, expensive, damaging, and 
unpopular storage facilities.  However, as Justice Blease makes abundantly 
clear, a speculative, flexible project that relies on an inherent flexibility in 
determining to whom its water will be sold is discouraged by the current 
legal regime.  Thus, it may be time to look again at the Water Code and see 
if, as Governor Jerry Brown noted over 20 years ago, it is impeding the 
"fullest beneficial use" of this crucial resource.18  
This article is divided into three parts.  Part I of this article discusses 
the current law of water transfers in California.  I briefly chart the evolution 
of the water transfer code and explore some of the difficult issues that the 
drafter's of the transfer code faced. While charting this evolution, I point out 
that the dialogue that took place while drafting the transfer code has been 
limited by its exclusive focus on conserved and surplus water.  Part II will 
take a close look at Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control 
Board ("CDWA v. SWRCB").  There, Justice Blease clearly articulates the 
statutory and precedential limits of California's law of water rights. His 
concise analysis serves to accentuate the places where the statutes fail to 
satisfy the explicit policy of increasing water efficiency in the state.  In Part 
III I will make suggestions for amendments to the Water Code that I think 
will address the largest obstacles to creating a viable water transfer market. 
15. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3rd at 901.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 475 (West 2007).
18. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-26-77 (May 11, 1977).
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I. Inception of The Transfer Codes
"Drought succeeds like nothing else in reminding Californians of their 
enormous dependence upon water."19  So begins the Final Report of the 
Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law ("the 
Commission").  The drought of 1976-77 had focused the state's attention on 
its water resource, and it highlighted the "principle strengths and 
weaknesses of the state's water rights law" as the state struggled, with 
minimal success, to adapt to the suddenly limited supply.20  In starting the 
Final Report with this sentence, the Commission was not merely striking a 
dramatic note to interest readers, it was also establishing a historical 
context of past crises and adaptations of which the report simply 
represented the latest chapter.21  Throughout its history, whether through 
legal precedent, legislation, popular opinion, or even common tradition, the 
law of water rights has adapted to the needs of Californians.  The Final 
Report was commissioned and written precisely because the water rights 
system did not provide the state with the "certainty, flexibility, and security 
that was needed"22 to meet water needs during the 1976-77 drought.23 
One goal of the Commission was to create a theoretical framework for 
legislation to encourage more efficient water use.24  Within this efficiency 
rubric, the Commission recommended legal amendments to encourage the 
development of a vigorous water transfer market.25  Though water transfers 
19. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
20. Id. at 2.
21. See Brian E. Gray, “In Search of Bigfoot”: The Common Law Origins of Article X,
Section 2 of the California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225 (1989), for a concise 
discussion of the evolution of California water law [hereinafter Bigfoot].  For a 
complete history, see NORRIS HUNDLEY, THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A
HISTORY (Universtiy of California Press 2001). 
22. Kimberly A. Felix, Improving Efficiency in Water Use: An Overview of the
Recommendations of the Governor’s Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, 36 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 165 (2005). 
23. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
24. Id. at 57; see also Caitlin S. Dyckman, A Dynastic Disruption: The Use Efficiency
and Conservation Legacy of the Governor’s Commission to Review California Water Rights Law 
Recommendations, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 175, 176 (2005). 
25. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 62 (“A property rights system in water which
permits voluntary transfers encourages the shift in resources from lower-value uses 
to higher-value uses.”). 
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have been "part of California water law since its inception,"26 water has not 
been traditionally viewed by the law as a marketable resource.27  The historic 
resistance to water markets is complex and almost inexplicable.  Water is 
"unique" because it is essential to human survival and also has aesthetic 
and recreational value.28  As such, water is heavily imbued with public 
interest and environmental value.29  It was partly to protect this public 
interest against its suspicion of an uncontrolled, monopolistic water market 
that led the Court in Lux v. Haggin to reject Haggin's invitation to apply a 
standard of reasonableness between appropriative and riparian rights.30  
Another explanation of water's uniqueness is its indeterminate nature: 
"Water is constantly shifting, and the supply changes to some extent every 
day."31  Whatever the reason for water's unique status, in drafting its 
recommendations, the Commission was acutely aware that the concept of a 
true water transfer market was not intuitive.  Because of these unique 
properties of water, fully nine of the twelve recommendations for amending 
the water code to encourage greater efficiency in water use addressed issues 
related to the development of a transfer market.32 
In 1980, the legislature responded to the Commission's Report.33  
Acknowledging that "the growing water needs of the state require the use of 
26. Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Transfers to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for
California, 4 Hastings W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 23, 24 (1996) [hereinafter Shape to 
Come]; see also McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water and Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220, 232-
33 (1859) (“The ownership of water . . . may be transferred like other property.”). 
27. CLIFFORD T. LEE, GOVERNOR’S COMM’N TO REV. CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, THE 
TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA:  BACKGROUND AND ISSUES STAFF PAPER NO. 5
(Dec. 1977). 
28. Id.
29. Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P. 2d. 5, 16 (1933) (“The present and
future well-being and prosperity of the state depend upon the conservation of its life-
giving waters . . . .  The conservation of other natural resources is of importance, but 
the conservation of the waters of the state is of transcendent importance.  Its waters 
are the very life blood of its existence.”). 
30. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 703 (1886) (“In our opinion, it does not require a
prophetic vision to anticipate that the adoption of the rule, so called, of 
‘appropriation’ would result in time in a monopoly of all the waters of the state by 
comparatively few individuals, or combinations of individuals controlling aggregated 
capital, who could either apply the water to purposes useful to themselves, or sell it 
to those from whom they had taken it away, as well as to others.”) (emphasis in original). 
31. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935).
32. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 71-72.
33. Selected 1980 California Legislation, 12 PAC. L.J. 525-528, 531 (1980).
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water in an efficient manner,"34 and that "the efficient use of water requires 
certainty in the definition of property rights to the use of water and 
transferability of such rights,"35 the legislature declared the state's new 
policy "to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water rights where 
consistent with the public welfare of the place of export and the place of 
import."36  To achieve this new policy, the legislature adopted six of the nine 
transfer market recommendations put forth by the Commission.37 This 
included amendments to the forfeiture doctrine to hold that a reduction in 
use resulting from conservation would be "deemed equivalent to a 
reasonable beneficial use of water," and not subject to forfeiture.38  Critically, 
section 1244 of the Water Code declared that participation in the water 
market would "not constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable use . . . and 
shall not affect any determination of forfeiture . . . ."39  Finally, the legislature 
decreed that once the term of a transfer had expired, rights automatically 
reverted to the transferor, with no action required by the Water Board.40  
These statutes demonstrate the legislature's serious effort to protect the 
rights of water users who participate in the water transfer market. 
Over the next several years, the legislature continued to strengthen the 
statutory framework of the transfer market41 by directing relevant agencies to 
actively encourage water users to participate in the market42 and providing 
incentives to facilitate conservation and efficiency to free up water for the 
transfer market.43  Due in part to these legislative efforts, and in part to the 
34. CAL. WATER CODE § 109(a) (West 2007).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Dyckman, supra note 24, at 183; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011, 1241, 1210-1211,
1212, 1244, 1725-1732, 1735-1740 (West 2007). 
38. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011, 1241 (West 2007).
39. CAL. WATER CODE § 1244 (West 2007); Under the previous version of section
1244, water used in the transfer market was considered surplus and subject to 
forfeiture. Under the new version of section 1244, water used in the transfer market 
was exempt from forfeiture. 
40. CAL. WATER CODE § 1737 (former § 1740) (West 2007).
41. Brian E. Gray, A Primer on California Water Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 745,
768-771 (1989) [hereinafter Primer].
42. CAL. WATER CODE § 109(b) (West 2007) (“The Legislature hereby directs the
Department of Water Resources, the State Water Resources Control Board, and all 
other appropriate state agencies to encourage voluntary transfers of water and water 
rights, including, but not limited to, providing technical assistance to persons to 
identify and implement water conservation measures which will make additional 
water available for transfer.”). 
43. Id.
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drought that began in 1988, a modest water transfer market began 
developing in California during the late 80s.44  The key word is "modest." 
Today the transfer market accounts for only 3 percent of all water used in 
California.45  It also remains massively concentrated, with more than 50 
percent of the transfers occurring within the SVP and CVP and another 35 
percent accounted for by government purchases for environmental 
purposes.46  Only 15 percent of the transfers since 1989 have occurred on the 
open market, and that market share is falling.47 
There are several reasons for this concentration.  These include 
statutory protections for third party effects, and suspicions on the part of 
farmers that they will ultimately lose their water rights if they participate in a 
market. First, the legislature has taken great care to protect third party 
interests as well as the interests of other water users against potential 
injuries caused by water transfers.48  There are also the statutory protections 
for environmental uses.49  This regulatory burden creates significant 
transaction costs, rendering transfers less attractive.  Second, despite 
legislative attempts to assuage their fears, farmers continue to be haunted 
by the infamous water grab in Owens Valley,50 and by their distrust of the 
"wasteful" urban water users who would buy their water.51 Even with all the 
statutory protections of water rights that the revised Water Code provides 
for water transferors,52 insecurity remains as to the certainty of those rights 
once a transfer agreement is initiated.53 
Another key factor that may be restricting the growth of the market is 
that, in most years, agricultural users provide at least 90 percent of the total 
market supply.54  The market's dependence on agricultural users creates the 
44. ELLEN HANAK, WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN CALIFORNIA? THIRD-
PARTY ISSUES AND THE WATER MARKET 12 (Public Policy Institute of California 2003). 
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1702, 1706 (West 2007); see also Gray, Shape to Come supra
note 26, at 28. 
49. CAL. WATER CODE § 1736 (West 2007).
50. Gray, Shape to Come, supra note 26, at 26; BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF
GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE WATER IN CALIFORNIA (Todd Baldwin ed., Island 
Press 2000). 
51. Dyckman, supra note 24, at 196.
52. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011, 1241, 1210-1211, 1212, 1244, 1725-1732, 1736
(former § 1735), 1737 (former § 1740) (West 2007). 
53. Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community: Lessons from California’s Drought
Water Bank, 1 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 17, 26 (1994) [hereinafter Water Bank]. 
54. Id. at 18.
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potential third-party effects that legislators and policy makers are most 
concerned with.55  Though the Water Code currently restricts the transfer 
market to conserved or surplus water,56 how water is conserved can have 
grave effects on local farming communities.  Most obvious, land that is 
fallowed to conserve water is land that is not put to use and thus results in 
pecuniary externalities such as loss of employment, machinery, seed, 
harvesting, processing, distribution, environmental impacts, and more.57  
Section 386 prevents these externalities by limiting the board's authority to 
approve transfers to cases where it has found that the change in use will not 
result in adverse effects.58  However, it also creates an obstacle to 
agricultural users who would otherwise be willing to participate in the 
market.  As a result, most transfers are local or regional,59 minimizing or 
eliminating any impact on the local economy and avoiding the statutory 
restrictions on third-party effects.60 
A further obstacle to the development of a strong transfer market is 
caused by tensions within the water code pertaining to the certainty of the 
property interest in water rights.61  The appropriative right to water is 
constrained to protect the certainty of the rights of all users.62  Thus, a right 
that is not put to beneficial use is forfeit.63  And the State has a duty to 
prevent the unreasonable or wasteful use of water,64 a determination that 
takes into account the circumstances of each case.65  When one considers 
these restrictions, it becomes reasonable to conclude that water which is 
available for market, water that has been conserved or is surplus, and has 
not been put to beneficial use, should, by definition, be water to which the 
would-be transferor has no legitimate property right.  The possibility of this 
outcome is a primary reason that the water transfer markets have had some 
difficulty gaining momentum in California. 
55. CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West 2007).
56. Id. § 475.
57. Hanak, supra note 45, at vii.
58. CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West 2007) (“The board may approve any
change . . . only if it finds that the change may be made without inuring any legal 
user of the water and without unreasonably affecting fish, wildlife, or other instream 
beneficial uses and does not unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area 
from which the water is being transferred.”) 
59. Id. at 20.
60. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1215-1222, 11460 (West 2007).
61. Gray, Shape to Come, supra note 26, at 24, 37, 49.
62. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200-1203, 1215-1222, 1225, 1240-1244 (West 2007).
63. Id. §§ 1240, 1241.
64. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
65. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (1967).
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In contrast, the large government projects (SWP and CVP), avoid many 
of these issues.66  First, the broad scope of these projects' water rights 
means that many intra-project transfers are not subject to the Board's 
scrutiny, so the statutory framework doesn't apply.67  Second, independent 
of the Water Code, each project adopted rules in the early 1990s to facilitate 
the trading of water among their users.68  Finally, though the Board has 
jurisdiction over water transfers of contractual rights — such as those 
typically at play with users of project water — water users have less fear 
transferring contractual rights than transferring appropriative rights. 
In its efforts to reproduce the greater successes of the intraproject 
transfer market, the legislature has made explicit attempts to exempt waters 
intended for the marketplace from the statutory restrictions that typically 
apply to water use.69  Inevitably, these efforts create tension between the 
policy of maintaining a public ownership of the state's water,70 and the 
desire to increase the efficiency of water use in the state71 by concentrating 
ownership of water in individuals.72 As discussed below, this tension also 
underlies CDWA v. SWRCB.73 
II. California Delta Water Association v. State Water Resources
Control Board
Justice Blease found two reasons to set aside the permits the Board 
granted to DW.74  First, he held that "an application for a permit to impound 
water in a reservoir must state, and the Water Board must determine, that 
an actual, intended beneficial use, in estimated amounts, will be made of 
the impounded waters."75  Second, he concluded that the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires the Board to "evaluate the use 
or uses specified by an amended application, determine whether they are 
beneficial and whether the amounts to be used can be reliably wheeled and 
66. Hanak, supra note 45, at 14.
67. Gray, Primer, supra note 42, at 779-780.
68. Hanak, supra note 45, at 14.
69. Id.
70. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2007) (“All water within the State is the
property of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired 
by appropriation in the manner provided by law.”). 
71. Id. § 475.
72. HADDAD, supra note 51, at xviii-xix.
73. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d
898 (2004). 
74. Id. at 901.
75. Id.
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are reasonably required for the beneficial use specified."76  It is the first 
reason, the "heart of the case," that is the focus of this paper. 77 
The case hinges on how "beneficial use" should be interpreted.  Justice 
Blease concluded that the Board had failed to specify a beneficial use 
because it did not require DW to specify the actual uses, amounts, and places 
of use of the water it intended to impound and sell before issuing the 
permits.78  Yet the Board had not ignored this issue.79 It acknowledged that if 
no one bought water from the project, "there [would] be no beneficial use of 
the water."80  However, it also concluded that since "the existing demand for 
water in California is not met in most years," it was reasonable to find that 
"the potential exists for the DW Project water to be beneficially used."81  Thus 
the issue is whether a beneficial use must be actual, as Blease concludes, or 
should a potential use be sufficient to satisfy the statutory and 
constitutional requirements. 
In finding that a potential beneficial use was sufficient to obtain a 
permit, the Board relied on section 1253 of the Water Code, which "gives the 
Water Board broad authority to condition a permit to meet the purposes 
served by the public interest."82  Justice Blease was not persuaded.  After 
exhaustive review, he concluded that section 1253 is constrained by the 
"procedural and substantive confines of the Water Code and state 
Constitution." 83 
But the case is not as clear as Justice Blease suggests.  In his analysis 
of the Water Code, Justice Blease correctly points out that section 100 of the 
Water Code replicates the language of Article X, section 2 of the California 
Constitution to the extent that "the right to water or to the use or flow of 
water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall 
be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial 
76. Id.
77. Id. at 904.
78. Id.
79. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1643, supra note 2, at 22.
80. Id.
81. Id.  (My emphasis).
82. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d  898,
908 (2004); CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2007), (“The board shall allow the 
appropriation for beneficial purposes of unappropriated water under such terms and 
conditions as in its judgment will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public 
interest the water sought to be appropriated.”). 
83. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 905-908 (Justice Blease cites the
following sections of the California Water Code: 100, 179, 186, 275, 1225, 1240, 1250, 
1260, 1262, 1264, 1266, 1301, 1345, 1347, 1348, 1350, 1375, 1381, 1395-98, 1610, 
1610.5, 1701, 1702).  He also cites CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, §§ 659-670, 696, 697, 715.). 
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use to be served."84  He further notes that: section 1240 requires that 
appropriation of water must be for a beneficial purpose;85 section 1260 
requires an applicant to set forth the nature, amount, and place of the 
intended use along with information pertaining to the specified use;86 there 
are strict, specific notice requirements;87 there is a requirement for a firm 
time frame within which that water will be put to use;88 and procedures for 
changing place or purpose of use are defined by statute.89 
A closer look at the Water Code suggests that Justice Blease overstates 
the Code's clarity with respect to a potential market transfer scheme such as 
that presented by DW.  Although he bases his analysis on the concept of 
reasonable and beneficial use as defined in the Constitution and the Water 
Code, Justice Blease does not articulate what he means by the use of those 
words.90  It is well established by California case law that the definition of 
reasonable use "depends on the circumstances of each case."91  As the Court 
in Joslin explained, the inquiry into reasonableness "cannot be resolved in 
vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance."92  
One consideration of transcendent importance, as articulated in the Water 
Code, is conservation via water markets.93  Article X, section 2 itself states 
that, "the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the 
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for 
the public welfare."94  The public interest thus strongly informs the meaning 
of "reasonable and beneficial use."  As the Commission and the legislation it 
84. Id.; CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2007).
85. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 906; CAL. WATER CODE § 1240
(West 2007). 
86. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1260(c), 1260(f), 1264, 1266 (West 2007).
87. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 906; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1300,
1301 (West 2007). 
88. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 906; CAL. WATER CODE § 1395
(West 2007). 
89. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 906-907; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 
1700-1707 (West 2007). 
90. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 905-906.
91. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (1967).
92. Id.
93. CAL. WATER CODE § 475 (West 2007) (“. . . [I]t is in the public interest to
conserve all available water resources, and . . . this interest requires the coordinated 
assistance of state agencies for voluntary water transfers to allow more intensive use 
of developed water resources . . . .”). 
94. CAL. CONST. art. X § 2.
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inspired emphasized, a viable water transfer market creates an important 
method for encouraging conservation.95 
It is therefore plausible that, despite its use of the word "potential," 
which drew Justice Blease's ire, the Board was articulating a use of water 
that was beneficial because it was "potential."96  Though DW and the Board 
describe a project with a relatively high cost per acre-foot of water and no 
specific buyer, the fact that demand for water is not met in most years 
suggests that it is possible that DW would nevertheless consistently find a 
market for its water. 97  The lack of a specific buyer would allow DW to sell to 
the highest bidder.  That buyer would presumably put the water to the most 
beneficial use after paying a premium for the water.  Thus, despite the fact 
that without a buyer there would be no beneficial use of the water, the 
Board concluded that the public interest in the benefits of added supply 
outweighed the minor risk of having no buyer. 98 
To put things into perspective, the Bureau of Reclamation estimated 
that if it were to build and operate the project, it would cost $348 million to 
build, plus $6 million per year for operating costs.99  The Bureau of 
Reclamation estimated that it could produce 110,000 afa at a cost of $336 
per acre-foot.100  Though these prices were too high for agricultural 
purposes,101 they were well below what municipal users would have paid.102  
For example, projected costs for desalinizing water for municipal use range 
from $800 per acre-foot to $2,000 per acre-foot.103  These rates suggest that 
municipalities that need water are willing to spend far more than the $336 
per acre-foot estimated by the Bureau of Reclamation for the DW project. 
DW itself estimated that the project would be feasible if they could sell 
water at a price between $265 per acre-foot and $700 per acre-foot.104  This is 
a decidedly broad range, and it might be an impossible goal during wet 
years.  Nonetheless, compared to the cost of desalination for municipal 
water, DW could easily fetch a price at the higher end of its stated range of 
95. CAL. WATER CODE § 475 (West 2007).
96. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898,
907 (2004). 
97. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1643, supra note 2, at 22-23.
98. Id. at 22-23, 61.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 22.
102. Id. at 23.
103. John McCarthy, The Problem With Fresh Water, 
http://www.formal.stanford.edu/jmc/progress/water.html (last visited October 28, 
2007). 
104. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1643, supra note 2, at 80.
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profitability.  A flexible project allowing transfers via the CVP and SWP —
which deliver water to nearly any part of the state — could capitalize on 
short term needs and, in the face of the ubiquitous need for more water, find 
a buyer who would put the water to beneficial use. 105 
The Water Code contains further support for a broad reading of 
beneficial use that would include the kind of use proposed by DW.106  
Specifically, the Water Code distinguishes between "long-term transfers" 
that exceed one year,107 and "temporary changes"108 of up to a year109 that 
alter the point of diversion, place, or purpose of use.110  Transfers that are 
deemed to be a temporary change — a category which most of DW's 
transfers would likely utilize — have clear administrative advantages over 
transfers deemed to be long term. First, they benefit from "improved 
procedures governing [Board] review of petitions to transfer water."111  
Second, they are exempt from the application of CEQA,112 — which if applied 
to temporary changes would result in "duplicative review and unnecessarily 
increase transaction costs without concomitant environmental benefits."113  
This loosening of the regulatory framework surrounding transfers, further 
demonstrates the legislature's interest in encouraging creative ways of 
improving the efficiency of the State's water use. 
On the other hand, the Water Code also contains sections that work 
against large categories of water transfers.  For example, section 480 of the 
Code, which establishes an "ongoing program to facilitate voluntary 
exchange or transfer of water," limits those transfers to water that "is already 
105. Wheeling conditions were included in the permit. State Water Resources
Control Board Decision 1643, condition 34b, supra note 2, at 108. 
106. These are in addition to third party interests (§§ 1014, 1017, 1736),
transferor property rights to transferred water (§§ 1011, 1241, 1244), and instream 
uses (§ 1736).  (West 2007) 
107. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1735-1737 (West 2007).
108. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725-1732 (West 2007).
109. The Model Transfer Act recommended a different scheme, with a short-
term transfer being two years or less and a long-term agreement being anything 
longer.  The short-term transfer would have a loosened standard of proof, where a 
petitioner would only need to present prima facie evidence that the transfer would 
not result in “significant injury” to legal users, fish, wildlife, or other instream uses, 
after which the burden would shift to opponents of the transfer.  See Gray, Shape to 
Come, supra note 26, at 39. 
110. CAL. WATER CODE, Div. 2 Chapter 10.5 (West 2007).
111. Gray, Shape to Come, supra note 26, at 38; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1726, 1727
(West 2007). 
112. CAL. WATER CODE § 1729 (West 2007).
113. Gray, Shape to Come, supra note 26, at 38.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008 
1658 
developed and being diverted from a stream for beneficial use or has been 
conserved."114  In other words, none of the statutes intended to facilitate 
transfer markets apply to undeveloped water.  The legislature is resistant to 
creating exceptions to the appropriative scheme of granting water rights as 
defined in division 2 of the Water Code.  As an example, the Commission 
recommended that that the legislature adopt a statute that would grant 
appropriators of salvage water "priority superior to all other water rights in 
the watercourse where such salvage efforts would not injure any lawful 
[water] user."115  The legislature refused to enact such a statute.116 
Nor has the legislature changed its philosophy in the ensuing decades. 
Nearly twenty years after the Commission, a group of academic experts led 
by Professor Brian Gray (University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law) drafted a Model Transfer Act.117  Recognizing that water transfers 
represent "an essential feature of California's water resources policy," the 
purpose of the Model Act was to modernize the transfer statutes so that 
"California's water transfer laws keep pace with the economic, social, and 
environmental needs of the state."118  Despite the expertise of the authors 
and broad support for the Model Transfer Act's proposals,119 the legislature 
chose not to adopt some of its key recommendations. 
For example, the Legislature did not adopt the Model Act's 
recommendations for expediting the transfer process,120 nor did it adopt the 
recommendation to change the period of short-term transfer from one to 
two years.121  These omissions reflect the legislature's crude understanding 
of the delicate balance between public management and private rights to 
use that the water-rights system attempts to strike.  On the one hand, 
statutory provisions that create a quasi-private, transferable right protected 
from the traditional doctrine of forfeiture encourage markets and thus more 
efficient use of water.  On the other hand, more protection for private rights 
means less state authority to regulate water use.  This in turn could result in 
114. CAL. WATER CODE § 480 (West 2007).
115. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 71.
116. Dyckman, supra note 24, at 189.
117. Gray, Shape to Come, supra note 26.
118. Id. at 24.
119. Id. at 23 (sponsored by the California Business Roundtable, the
California Chamber of Commerce, the California Farm Bureau Federation, and the 
California Manufacturers Association, the authors of the Model Transfer Act 
solicited comments from water users, district managers, project operators, state 
and federal regulators, and environmentalists in addition to conducting two sets of 
focus groups). 
120. Id. Part E.
121. Id. at 5.
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less efficient water use or water use that pits property rights against the 
public interest.122  In practice, the right to use water in California has always 
been a function of the public interest and water has been allocated based in 
large part on the social value of the use.123  The role of the public interest in 
the allocation of water has only increased with time, gradually eroding the 
private right.124  The move to facilitate water transfer markets, which 
requires "enhanced protection of water rights,"125 represents a movement 
against this trend. 
It is no wonder that a decision such as CDWA v. SWCRB, which 
attempts to articulate a clear statement of water policy, as it is traditionally 
understood, is in tension with the transfer provisions of the Water Code. 
The locus of that tension exists in Justice Blease's disagreement with the 
Board's application of the doctrine of beneficial use.  Justice Blease focuses 
on the Board's acknowledgment that "unless someone buys the water or the 
project, there will be no beneficial use of the water."126  The Board attempts 
to mitigate this risk by conditioning the permit on the requirement that a 
buyer of the water "be identified before the reservoirs are filled above mean 
sea level."127  Blease was unimpressed, and reasoned that, "because no 
actual purchasers for the Project water were identified, the Board could not 
have analyzed the nature and impact of any specific use of the impounded 
water as required by the Water Code."128  Blease then spends the next three 
pages of his opinion articulating the rigor that the Water Code demands 
with respect to specificity of purpose, place, use, amount, time, and method 
of appropriating water.129  He also describes the Board's obligation to map, 
schedule, and police permitted appropriations.130  This tour of the Water 
122. See Haddad, supra note 51, at 45.
123. See Gray, Bigfoot, supra note 21, at 241, (discussing Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140
(1855), Professor Gray notes that, “even at the birth of California water law, water 
rights in this state were limited by the notion that one’s water right depends in part 
on the social utility of one’s use of that water in relation to alternative uses.”). 
124. See, e.g., People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining, 4 P. 1152 (1884); Gin S. Chow v.
City of Santa Barbara, 20 P.2d 317, 16-17 (1933); Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 
889 (1967); Colberg Inc. v. Cal. ex rel. Dep’t. of Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3, 14-15 (1967); Marks 
v. Whitney, 491P.2d 374, 380-381 (1971); Nat’l. Audubon Soc’y v. Super.Ct., 658 P.2d 709,
732 (1983).
125. Gray, Shape to Come, supra note 26, at 37.
126. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898,
904 (2004). 
127. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1643, supra note 2, at 23.
128. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 905.
129. Id. at 905-907.
130. Id.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008 
1660 
Code leads to his conclusion that the "purpose of these Water Code 
requirements is to enable the Board to carry out its duty to determine "the 
estimated amount which can be put to beneficial use."131 
Under Justice Blease's Water Code, it is inevitable that a "statement of 
alternative potential beneficial uses" would "fail[] to meet these 
requirements."132  But Justice Blease ignores the Board's condition that 
buyers be identified before any water can be stored above sea level.  This 
condition is essentially the same term the Board applied in State Water 
Resources Control Board Decision1422 ("Board Decision 1422"),133 which 
was challenged famously by the Bureau of Reclamation in California v. 
United States,134 and upheld on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court by the 
Ninth Circuit.135 
In Board Decision 1422, the Board decided that the Bureau of 
Reclamation could not "meet the statutory requirements for approval of a 
permit to appropriate water" without a specific plan for current beneficial 
use of water from New Melones Reservoir.136  Explaining that the "limited 
unappropriated water resource of the State should not be committed to an 
applicant in the absence of a showing of his actual need for the water within 
a reasonable time in the future," the Board nevertheless granted a permit. 
Justification for granting the apparently unlawful permit derived from the 
condition which prohibited "the impoundment of water in New Melones 
Reservoir for consumptive purposes until . . . a showing that . . . the 
permittee has firm commitments to deliver the water . . . ."137  In other words, 
without contracts, the permit was simply a paper right, and the unallocated 
water could be used elsewhere.  The permit was predicated on a "potential" 
future beneficial use. 
The Board's decision to grant the permit for a potential use was never 
challenged.  Regardless, Justice Blease concludes that, "[a] statement of 
alternative potential beneficial uses fails to meet [the Water Code's] 
requirements."138  In fact, rather than finding support for Board Decision 
1643 in Board Decision 1422, Justice Blease uses the prohibition against 
131. Id. at 907 (quoting CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 23, § 696).
132. Id. at 907.
133. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1422, condition 2
(April, 1973). 
134. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
135. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982).
136. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1422, supra note 137, at
14-15.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898,
907 (2004). 
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impounding waters without a specific beneficial use in Board Decision 1422 
as precedent against Board Decision 1643.139  Though he does not provide 
reasoning for his decision, there are at least two possible explanations. 
First, he might have argued that there is a clear difference between the 
permits at issue in Board Decision1422 and those at issue in Board Decision 
1643.  In Board Decision 1422, the Board retained jurisdiction over the 
permit and the Bureau of Reclamation was forced to demonstrate to the 
Board that it had contracts for beneficial use of the water before the Board 
would release jurisdiction.140  In contrast, in Board Decision 1643, the Board 
delegated authority over deciding when a specific beneficial use was 
established to the Chief of the Division of Water Rights.141  Justice Blease 
found this to be an illegitimate delegation of authority.142 
Second, the massive scale of the statewide CVP and SWP projects 
meant that by their very nature the projects would supply "multiple 
potential places of use."143  The DW project, in contrast, would have been of 
a much smaller scale, and the phrase "alternative potential beneficial uses,"144  
rather than suggesting the multiplicity of uses of the major projects, 
suggests speculative use, which Justice Blease expressly rejects.145 
A third, related distinction was between the large, government-
sponsored, public water projects and the small, for-profit, private DW Project. 
Evidence that this distinction informed Justice Blease's reasoning is found 
in Blease's finding that, unlike the DW Project, the SWP was "mandated by 
statute (§ 11125), in furtherance of a general or coordinated plan for 
development of water resources in the State of California (§ 10500)."146  The 
"massive" public projects were inherently and inevitably imbued with the 
public interest.  For Blease, "there is no analogy to be drawn" between the 
two projects.147  Thus, despite their apparent similarity, the phrases 
"alternative potential beneficial use" and "multiple potential places of use" 
are not analogous and do not deserve the same treatment under the law as 
stated in the Water Code. 
139. Id. at 909.
140. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1422, supra note 137, at 18.
141. Compare State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1422, supra note
137, (“until further order of the Board”), with State Water Resources Control Board 
Decision 1643, supra note 2, (“[T]he Chief can determine that the water will be placed 
to beneficial use.”). 
142. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 907-908.
143. Id. at 909.
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Yet there is an analogy.  California v. United States was decided in 1978, 
when the Commission was putting together its Final Report.148  As discussed 
above, the legislature had made some sweeping policy statements in 
response to the Final Report, particularly with regard to the facilitation of 
water transfer markets to encourage the conservation of water.149  One can 
read this policy statement as a "mandate" similar to the mandate invoking 
the State Water Project.  Section 475 invokes the public interest, 
conservation, efficiency, and coordinated assistance of state agencies.150  
Likewise, sections 11125-11128 invoke the public interest, conservation, and 
state agencies.151  But the similarities do not end there.  Justice Blease 
describes the SWP as being "in furtherance of a general or coordinated plan 
for the development of water resources."152  Similarly, section 475 describes 
a general plan to "allow more intensive use of developed water resources."153 
The SWP was paid for by bonds, notes Justice Blease.154  The transfer market 
also includes provisions for state incentives and assistance to prospective 
market participants.155  Thus, the statutory parallels, though not identical, 
are strikingly similar and suggest that the Board's Decisions 1422 and 1643 
may not be as clearly distinguishable as Justice Blease concludes. 
In the case of the DW Project, the Board's conclusion regarding the 
beneficial nature of DW's proposed use, a conclusion inextricably 
interwoven with its duty of comprehensive planning and "statewide 
considerations of transcendent importance,"156 is frustrated by the court's 
non-deferential reading of the Water Code.  The question of how the term 
"beneficial" should be interpreted ultimately thus turns on a more 
fundamental question: what is the proper "relationship between legislative 
provisions governing administrative regulation of reclamation of waste water 
and judicial enforcement of the self executing provision of article X, section 
2?"157  In other words, who should have jurisdiction over issues pertaining to 
the management of California's water resource: the courts or the Board?158  
148. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
149. CAL. WATER CODE § 475 (West 2007).
150. Id.
151. Id.  §§ 11125-11128.
152. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 909.
153. CAL. WATER CODE § 475 (West 2007).
154. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 909.
155. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 480-484 (West 2007).
156. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (1967).
157. Environmental Def. Fund, Inc. v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 9 (1980)
(EDF II);  see also In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal.3d 339 (1979). 
158. Note that the Court itself has waffled with respect to this question.  In
Environmental Def. Fund, Inc. v. E. Bay Mun. Utility Dist., 572 P.2d 1128, 1135-36 (1977) 
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In CDWA, the Board argues that section 1253 of the Water Code gives it 
authority to guarantee that water will be used for beneficial purposes by 
imposing "such terms and conditions as in its judgment will best develop, 
conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be 
appropriated."159  Justice Blease rejects the Board's interpretation of section 
1253, finding that it "ignore[s] the detailed statutory and regulatory 
requirements it must meet in issuing a permit to appropriate water."160  
Regardless of who has the better argument, the question of what level of 
review the courts should have over Board decisions may impact the 
flexibility of the state to adapt to changing hydrological conditions. 
III. Suggested Statutory Amendments
Any solution to the problem exposed by Justice Blease's decision in 
CDWA must be sensitive to the delicate balance existing within California 
water rights.  Blithely granting sole jurisdiction to the Board would 
undermine a jurisprudential tradition that has its roots in the birth of the 
state, and might undermine the power and flexibility of article X, section 2. 
Likewise, statutory amendments that grant aggressive protections for private 
property rights in water could threaten public interest in this communal 
resource.  Nevertheless, the case demonstrates that there is water available 
that is not being used. 
The Water Code could be amended in a manner that preserves the 
existing balance but also facilitates better development in the water transfer 
market.  One suggestion would be to discard limitations on the type of water 
available for use in the transfer market.  Instead of limiting the transfer 
(EDF I), the court held that the Water Code “vest[s] the SWRCB with full authority to 
‘exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the state in the field of water 
resources.’”  However, EDF II reversed, holding that “the courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the legislatively established administrative agencies to enforce the 
self-executing provisions of article X, section 2.” 605 P.2d at 10.  However, the Court 
remained uncomfortable with the EDF II holding.  In National Audubon, Justice 
Broussard “seriously considered whether, in light of the broad powers and duties 
which the legislature has conferred on [SWRCB], we should overrule EDF II and 
declare that henceforth the board has exclusive primary jurisdiction in matters falling 
within its purview.” 658 P.2d at 731 (1983).  Ultimately, Justice Broussard reasoned 
that, since the Court could refer difficult issues to the Board, “the courts, through the 
exercise of sound discretion and the use of their reference powers, can substantially 
eliminate the danger that litigation will bypass the board’s expert knowledge and 
frustrate its duty of comprehensive planning.”  Id. at 732.  CDWA may cast a new, less 
rosy light on Justice Broussard’s optimistic conclusion. 
159. Cent. Delta Water Agency, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 908.
160. Id.
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market to conserved and surplus waters from sources that have already been 
developed,161 the legislature could easily include all water available for 
appropriation that satisfies a rigorous "no harm" proviso.  Thus, Water Code 
section 475 and section 480 would be changed to eliminate this restriction: 
475. The Legislature hereby finds and declares that
voluntary water transfers between water users can result in
a more efficient use of water, benefiting both the buyer and
the seller.
The Legislature further finds and declares that transfers 
of surplus water on an intermittent basis can help alleviate 
water shortages, save capital outlay development costs, 
and conserve water and energy. 
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is in 
the public interest to conserve all available water resources, 
and that this interest requires the coordinated assistance of 
state agencies for voluntary water transfers to allow more 
intensive use of developed water resources in a manner 
that fully protects the interests of other entities which have 
rights to, or rely on, the water covered by a proposed 
transfer. 
480. The department shall establish an ongoing program to
facilitate the voluntary exchange or transfer of water and
implement the various state laws that pertain to water
transfers.  The department shall seek to facilitate these
transactions only if the water to be transferred is already
developed and being diverted from a stream for beneficial 
use or has been conserved. 
Though it might seem that the changes to section 480 risk creating an 
opportunity for monopolists to take advantage of the system, there are 
implicit obstacles to such an event.  First, though the DW project 
demonstrates that there is potential for significant storage opportunities in 
the state, the expense and innovative nature of the project also demonstrate 
that such opportunities are limited and represent a modest percentage of 
the state's water resources.  Second, the Board still has the authority to 
deny a permit to appropriate water for such storage projects should it find 
that the project does not serve a beneficial use. 
The market would also benefit from a reconsideration of the Model 
Transfer Act's suggestion to expand temporary transfers to include a period 
161. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 475, 480 (West 2007).
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of up to two years.162  This would reduce bureaucratic impediments to 
transfers, without significantly elevating the risk that the transfer will cause 
permanent harm. 
1728.  For the purposes of this article, a temporary change 
means any change of point of diversion, place of use, or 
purpose of use involving a transfer or exchange of water or 
water rights for a period of one two years or less.  The two-
year period does not include any time required for 
monitoring, reporting, or mitigation before or after the 
temporary change is carried out.  If, within a period of one 
two years or less, the water involved in the temporary 
change is moved to off-stream storage outside of the 
watershed where the water originated, the change shall be 
considered a temporary change, and the water moved to 
off-stream storage outside the watershed where the 
water originated may be put to beneficial use in the 
place of use and for the purposes of use specified in the 
board's order approving the temporary change either 
during or after that period. 
1735.  The board may consider a petition for a long-term 
transfer of water or water rights involving a change of point 
of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use.  A long-term 
transfer shall be for any period in excess of one two years. 
Less subtle, and possibly more controversial, would be an 
amendment, to the definition of beneficial use that includes water stored 
solely for speculative transfer purposes: 
The appropriation and storage of water for transfer 
purposes constitutes a beneficial use of water if the water 
so stored is thereafter applied to beneficial purposes. 
This would shift the balance in the property right to water, but it could 
also be constrained by rigorous Board oversight and tight forfeiture 
requirements should the water not be put to beneficial use.  Further, a 
permit condition that limits the appropriation of water to the amount 
necessary to satisfy actual transfer contracts, such as the conditions in 
Board Decisions 1422 and 1643, would allow the Board to ensure that any 
appropriated water was ultimately put to beneficial use.  Such a rule has the 
162. Gray, Shape to Come, supra note 27, at 5; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1728, 1735
(West 2007). 
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advantage of leaving the traditional status of Court-Board concurrent 
jurisdiction untouched.  However, as state management of water shifts to a 
realm of special expertise — caused by climate change, an increasing 
population, a decreasing supply, and the continued recognition of the 
environmental benefits of water — perhaps it is time to reconsider 
concurrent jurisdiction, and limit court review of Board permit decisions, at 
least with respect to beneficial use, to an abuse of discretion standard. 
Such a rule might read as follows: 
The Court is authorized to review Board decisions regarding 
beneficial use of the state's waters under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. 
Conclusion 
Justice Blease's opinion in Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water 
Resources Control Board demonstrates an inherent tension underlying our 
water management policy in California: the tension between the desire to 
apply market principles (privatization) to water management and the need 
to maintain state control of this public resource.  This tension is carried into 
the Water Code, which contains internal conflicts with respect to nature of 
the right to the use of water.  Given the complexities of our water rights 
system and the many competing demands for limited supply, it is perhaps 
inevitable that our policies will at times be self-conflicting.  The question 
then becomes how, or more properly who, should be responsible for 
harmonizing the conflicts. 
As the recommendations above demonstrate, the goal of invigorating 
the transfer market in California can be achieved without radical statutory 
amendments.  However, the shift that is most needed is to vest more power 
and authority in the Board.  There is at least some power to the argument 
that, if climate change brings the hydrological changes anticipated, and if 
demand continues to grow, the reality "on the ground" will eventually result 
in a voluntary shift of power to the Board.  The history of water management 
in California teaches us that the law adapts to the needs of the state. 
Perhaps the important difference, today, is that when law and policy adapt 
too slowly, the damage — to species, habitat, water purity, even public 
health — can be irreversible.  Anticipation and proactive solutions are the 
safest way to address impending change. 
